Alberto Voltolini

Fiction and Indexinames

(Abstract)


In this paper, I will start from considering some theoretical desiderata concerning sentences that directly or indirectly involve fiction: i) the fictional use of language requires a context-shift; ii) one understands a sentence whether it is used fictionally or not; iii) one and the same proper name is, typically at least, used both within a certain work of fiction, i. e., when the sentence containing it is used fictionally, and outside that work of fiction, i. e., when, apparently at least, the sentence containing it is used nonfictionally yet in order to indirectly concern that very fiction; iv) different naming practices are to be mobilized by such different uses (independently of whether the apparently nonfictional use is actually successful as far as the reference of the name is concerned); v) independently of their really having a referent, proper names are always devices of direct reference. I will claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one can account for some tensions that arise from the aforementioned desiderata. According to my proposal, a proper name »N.N.« is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description »the individual called ›N.N.‹ (in context)«, where this description means »the individual one’s interlocutor’s attention is called to by means of ›N.N.‹ (in context)«. This character is a partial function that maps narrow contexts onto referents. Such contexts are enriched narrow contexts that over and above the traditional parameters (agent, space, time and world) also include an »acquisition« parameter, i. e., a parameter filled by a naming practice constituted by an informal act of dubbing (in which the dubber tries to call one’s attention via the name to something), and usually also by a certain transmission chain. By appealing to this context, an indexiname automatically acquires a referent, if there is any (quite similar to the way things work with demonstratives once their narrow contexts are taken to be enriched by a further parameter, typically a »demonstration« parameter). Furthermore, I claim that such a proposal works independently of one’s ontological stance concerning fictional entities, that is, independently of whether one believes either that there are or that there are no such entities. Simply put, individuals of different kinds (actual fictional characters for realists, nonactual individuals for anti-realists) are picked out by indexinames in the relevant narrow contexts. Furthermore, I will argue that such a proposal is advantageous to similar indexicalist proposals such as the one put forward by Tiedke (2011), for that proposal seems unnecessarily ad hoc and it is still too undeveloped. Finally, I will try to show how this proposal can deal with some objections one may raise against an indexicalist treatment of proper names: a) the objection from validity, claiming that if names are indexicals, then one can no longer account for the validity of certain inferences involving them; b) the objection from contexts, claiming that if names are indexicals, then one cannot plausibly account for sentences involving them (in context) to be absolutely true (true in that context).

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